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Abstract 
Set against the backdrop of Nebraska’s 2015 legislative repeal of the death penalty 
and the 2016 electoral reinstatement, we examined public support for capital pun-
ishment. Using two years of statewide survey data, we compared respondents who 
preferred the death penalty for murder, those who preferred other penalties, and 
those who were unsure, a respondent group often excluded from research. To un-
derstand what distinguishes among these groups, we examined media consumption, 
instrumental and expressive feelings about crime, and confidence and trust in the 
government regarding criminal justice. Results revealed that those who preferred 
the death penalty expressed more anger about crime and greater distrust, but per-
ceived the death penalty as applied more fairly, relative to the other groups. The 
unsures, compared to those who preferred other penalties, were less trusting and 
viewed the death penalty as applied more fairly. The persistence of public support 
for capital punishment may best be understood for its symbolic, expressive qualities. 
Keywords: capital punishment, death penalty, punitiveness 
In 2015, Nebraska made national and international headlines, becoming the 
first consistently conservative “red” state in the US to abolish the death pen-
alty when the legislature overrode the governor’s veto on Nebraska Legisla-
tive Bill 268 (LB268) (BBC, 2015; Bearman, 2015a; Bosman, 2015). This ac-
tion reflected a larger movement among conservative lawmakers who were 
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revisiting the tough-on-crime stance that dominated past decades (Pickett, 
2016), as well as initiatives in other states to eliminate the death penalty 
(Seiver, 2015). Nevertheless, during the 2016 election cycle, following a cam-
paign by pro-death penalty politicians and special interest groups, Nebras-
kans voted to keep capital punishment (Cohen, 2016). In spite of some pol-
iticians – and because of others – the reinstatement of capital punishment 
directly reflected popular will (Garland, 2010). 
Why has declining public support, at least nationally (Gallup, n.d.), not 
readily translated to public action at the polls? Researchers have identified 
several factors that are related to death penalty support, including media 
consumption (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Kleck and Jackson, 2017), in-
strumental and expressive concerns about crime (Wozniak, 2017), and atti-
tudes about the government and fairness of the justice system (Peffley and 
Hurwitz, 2007; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Conspicuously absent from much 
of the research, however, are those people who respond to death penalty 
opinion questions with “no opinion” or “unsure” (Unnever et al., 2005). Dis-
covering their motivations may yield insights into why public opinion polls 
do not neatly align with political preferences. Indeed, Garland (2005: 360) 
theorized that political change toward full abolition will tend to occur when 
this “uncommitted, ambivalent group” can be mobilized. 
Using Nebraska as a case study, our primary purpose was to distinguish 
among those who preferred the death penalty for murder, those who pre-
ferred other penalties (e.g., life sentences), and the “unsures,” examining 
a series of factors that have been theoretically and/or empirically linked to 
death penalty support. To begin, we review public support for the death pen-
alty in national polls and discuss how the unsures are typically handled in 
death penalty research. Then, we outline the theoretical and empirical fac-
tors tied to punitiveness and support for the death penalty. To provide con-
text we briefly describe Nebraska’s recent legislative history regarding capi-
tal punishment. In our analysis, we draw on two statewide surveys gathered 
during the death penalty legislative debate and ballot initiative. We exam-
ine how media consumption, instrumental and expressive concerns about 
crime, and attitudes about the government’s role in controlling crime and 
the application of the death penalty distinguished among the three groups. 
We conclude with a discussion of the unsures and the symbolic, expressive 
nature of death penalty support. 
Public support for the death penalty 
While states grapple with cost and equity issues, public opinion on capital 
punishment has slowly waned. National polls show a decline in public sup-
port for the death penalty since the peak years in the mid-1990s. At its 1994 
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peak, Gallup (n.d.) noted 80% of people were in favor of the death penalty, 
compared to 60% in 2016. Pew Research placed that recent figure even 
lower, with 49% of respondents favoring capital punishment and 42% op-
posing it (Oliphant, 2016). Support of life imprisonment for murder, in con-
trast, has increased, from 29% in 1993 to 45% in 2014 (Gallup, n.d.). There 
have been substantial declines in the belief that the death penalty is a de-
terrent, such that two-thirds of people do not think it deters serious crimes 
(Gallup, n.d.; Pew Research Center, 2015). There has also been a decline in 
the belief that the death penalty is fairly applied, from 61% in 2005 to 50% 
in 2016 (Gallup, n.d.), and nearly three-fourths of people think there is a 
risk of executing an innocent person (Pew Research Center, 2015). Reflect-
ing the decline in support and the increase in doubts about the death pen-
alty, several states have issued moratoria on capital punishment or discontin-
ued the penalty altogether (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.(b)). The 
overall declining support for capital punishment across the nation stands in 
contrast to what Nebraska voters ultimately decided in 2016 (Cohen, 2016). 
The elusive unsures 
A long-standing issue in death penalty research is how to best measure peo-
ple’s opinions, acknowledging that the way in which a support question is 
asked influences results (Unnever et al., 2005; Worthen et al., 2014; Woz-
niak, 2017).1 In particular, scholars have recognized that when people are 
given the option of the death penalty alongside other alternatives like a life 
sentence, the proportion of respondents selecting the death penalty declines. 
Response options to survey items about support also vary in format. Survey 
items may be forced-choice, so that people who have no opinion or who are 
unsure may skip the question entirely rather than choose an option that does 
not represent their opinions. Other items may explicitly offer a response op-
tion such as “don’t know” or “unsure” that allows these undecided respon-
dents a valid choice. In either case, respondents who answer “no opinion,” 
“don’t know,” or “unsure” to death penalty questions are often excluded from 
the conversation because they are coded into missing for analytic purposes 
(e.g., Unnever et al., 2005).2 Because such answers are not random this ap-
proach may result in sample selection bias (Oravecz et al., 2014). 
Those who do not express an opinion on surveys may not care about the 
topic, may be reticent to answer political questions, may have weakly-held 
attitudes, or may be truly unsure (Laurison, 2015; Luskin and Bullock, 2011; 
Oravecz et al., 2014). Gallup polls from 1995 to 2016 indicate a decline in 
those who answer “no opinion” to a question asking if respondents are in 
favor of the death penalty, from 10% to 3%. Likewise, reports from 2000 to 
2014 illustrate that gains in the proportion of people supporting life impris-
onment over the death penalty have been accompanied by declines in the 
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no opinion group. Such trends hint that this block may be more malleable 
or movable by contemporaneous political climate regarding capital punish-
ment (Garland, 2005). For example, Unnever et al. (2005: 207) noted that 
a significant portion of poll respondents only weakly supported the death 
penalty and many had reservations about it. Weakly-held attitudes about the 
death penalty may be due to the availability of new information about prob-
lems with capital punishment, as well as conflicting core values regarding 
the sanctity of life, retribution, and fairness. 
Understanding punitiveness and attitudes about the death penalty 
Due to measurement limitations and theoretical inattention, little is known 
about who the unsures are and how they may differ from those respondents 
who have clearer opinions. Demographically, death penalty supporters, com-
pared to nonsupporters, tend to be men, White, older, and politically con-
servative (Anderson et al., 2017; Pew Research Center, 2015). Research has 
explored several factors contribute to individual attitudes about the death 
penalty and punitive sentiment more generally; as noted, such research typ-
ically excludes the unsures. 
First, research points to media framing of crime as the work of immoral 
yet rational actors and its connection with punitiveness (Dowler, 2003; 
Surette, 2003). The framing of the crime problem in the media (Altheide 
and Michalowski, 1999) and by politicians (Frost, 2010) typically reinforces 
the punitive status quo when it comes to punishment. According to Enns 
(2016), in the aggregate, reporting about crime and the tone of that re-
porting has generally influenced public punitiveness over time. Media con-
sumption, across several genres, has been linked to support for more pu-
nitive attitudes (Kleck and Jackson, 2017; Rosenberger and Callanan, 2011) 
and support for the death penalty (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Kleck and 
Jackson, 2017; Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011). News viewing has also been 
linked with strongly held opinions favorable to the death penalty (Unnever 
et al., 2005). 
The media are implicated in what many people see and know about crime, 
but media consumption itself is typically insufficient in explaining punitive-
ness. People’s perceptions of crime may shape their attitudes about punish-
ment. Thus, a second set of factors focuses on whether attitudes arise from 
instrumental versus expressive stances regarding crime and punishment 
(Wozniak, 2017). Personal concerns about crime, risk, and victimization 
may evoke an instrumental response, namely advocating for harsher punish-
ments to curb or control crime. People often report that the crime rate is on 
the rise, even when official data show it is not (Gramlich, 2017; McCarthy, 
2015). This belief may be tied to media saturation with crime (Goidel et al., 
2006; Lowry et al., 2003), heightened political wrangling over crime issues 
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(Beckett, 1997), as well as personal experiences with crime (Weitzer and Ku-
brin, 2004) that may make the crime issue particularly salient (Frost, 2010). 
If people believe crime is a problem or are worried about victimization, 
they may prefer more punitive forms of punishment in order to preserve 
public safety. When people believe the crime rate is problematic, they tend to 
be supportive of more absolute and punitive forms of punishment (Unnever 
and Cullen, 2010). Yet, research on the effect of instrumental concerns on 
punitiveness is mixed. Kleck and Jackson (2017) found that perceptions of 
the crime rate, perceived risk, and fear of crime were generally unrelated to 
death penalty support and punitive attitudes, whereas Costelloe et al. (2009) 
found that fear of crime and general concern about crime were related to 
greater punitiveness. Worry about or fear of crime has frequently been ex-
amined, although the connection between fear and death penalty support is 
also equivocal (e.g., Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011; Wozniak, 2017). 
Punitive sentiments may also be value expressive (Vollum and Buffing-
ton-Vollum, 2010), potentially outweighing instrumental concerns (Tyler and 
Weber, 1982). The idea—if not the practice—of the death penalty has moral 
and emotional appeal (Garland, 2010). Pew Research Center (2015) found 
that two-thirds of people felt the death penalty for murder is morally justi-
fied. Moreover, specifically among those who said they supported the death 
penalty, 90% felt it was morally justified. Advocating for harsher sentences 
or capital punishment expresses the moral outrage associated with crime 
and those who commit it, as well as the moral imperative for retribution and 
just deserts (Lynch, 2002; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). 
Anger specifically about crime may be expressed through punitiveness. In 
fact, anger may be a more common reaction to crime than fear (Ditton et al., 
1999). Anger may be centered in perceived threats to the moral order posed 
by crime, perceived inability to maintain public order, or broader insecuri-
ties resulting from social change (Ditton et al., 1999; Karstedt, 2002; Lyons 
and Scheingold, 2000). Moreover, in socio-political periods characterized by 
instability or insecurity, punitiveness may represent an appeal to “hostile 
solidarity,” in which people can experience both an emotional release and a 
sense of belonging predicated on fiercely othering criminals (Carvalho and 
Chamberlen, 2018: 228). Anger about crime has been linked to support for 
punitive policies, controlling for fear (Goodall et al., 2013; Hartnagel and 
Templeton, 2012; Johnson, 2009). 
A third set of factors is people’s beliefs in the ability of the government to 
apply the death penalty fairly and to address crime reliably. Nearly three-
fourths of people in a Pew poll saw some risk in an innocent person being 
executed, and half thought minorities were more likely to receive the death 
penalty (Pew Research Center, 2015). Indeed, the decline in support for the 
death penalty has been linked to the belief that it is applied unfairly, partic-
ularly along racial lines (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007). Wozniak (2017) found 
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that people who thought justice system was fair and unbiased more strongly 
supported death penalty. Relatedly, Baumgartner et al. (2008) argued that 
increased coverage of potential errors in the capital punishment process and 
the possibility of wrongful executions— the “innocence frame”—contributed 
to the declining public support for the death penalty. Research suggests that 
people exposed to cases situated within the innocence frame are more likely 
to take those concerns into consideration when thinking about the death pen-
alty (Dardis et al., 2008; Lambert et al., 2011). 
Despite the effects of the innocence frame and the slow national decline 
in favorable attitudes, public support for the death penalty persists. One ex-
planation for the American public’s persistent punitiveness is the escalating 
crime-distrust model (Unnever and Cullen, 2010). According to this model, 
the public’s belief that crime is pervasive and personally threatening ex-
ists in parallel to the belief that the government has failed in its efforts to 
manage and control crime. Further, the government, as represented by the 
courts, has failed to protect victims by coddling criminals. The ostensible 
solution, then, is to crack down on criminals through legislation mandating 
harsher punishments. Citing the cultural contradiction that a populace that 
distrusts it government nonetheless empowers it to execute people, Zimring 
(2003) argued that American culture required a reframing of capital punish-
ment’s purpose after the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. Capital pun-
ishment was fashioned as justice for the victims and closure for their fam-
ilies, couched in the vigilante tradition in which the community takes care 
of its own. This sense of vigilantism may nullify distrust, making execution 
palatable to the citizenry. 
Research on trust in government and punitiveness is equivocal, due in 
part to the variety of ways in which trust has been operationalized. Studies 
focused specifically on courts have found no association between trust and 
death penalty support (Brown and Socia, 2017; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). 
Using a broader measure of distrust, Unnever et al. (2005) found no effect 
on death penalty support. Soss et al. (2003) also used a broader measure of 
government trust and found trust was associated with death penalty sup-
port among Whites. Similarly, Messner et al. (2006) found that Whites who 
distrusted government were more likely to support the death penalty, but 
African-Americans who distrusted government were less likely to support 
it. Other research suggests people who distrust the government, or find it 
lacking when it comes to punishment, are more punitive (Bader et al., 2010; 
Wonziak, 2017; Zimring et al., 2001). 
The current study 
Prior research offers insight into the factors associated with death penalty 
support. Missing from these analyses, however, is an explicit attempt to 
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uncover the how supporters differ from both opponents and people who are 
unsure of their position. Knowing more about the latter group may yield in-
sight into the differences between the opinion polls and the voting booths. 
The overarching purpose of the study was to understand what factors dis-
tinguish among people who prefer the death penalty for murder, people who 
prefer other penalties (e.g., life sentences), and the unsures, addressing a 
specific gap in the literature. The recent political focus on capital punish-
ment in Nebraska offers a unique opportunity to study public opinion in a 
context where those opinions could have real-world impact. 
Nebraska is one of two states in the United States with a unicameral leg-
islature; the legislature is officially nonpartisan, although Republicans hold 
the majority of seats. Currently, 11 inmates in Nebraska are under death 
sentences (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.(a)). In 2015, Senator Er-
nie Chambers, a perennial opponent of capital punishment, introduced leg-
islation to abolish the death penalty.3 Several senators added their names as 
co-introducers of LB268, an effort that saw cooperation across the political 
spectrum. In part, Nebraska’s attempt to abolish the death penalty echoed 
the political tone of “Right on Crime” conservative advocates for criminal 
justice reforms, who are motivated by the costs of bloated correctional sys-
tems (Green, 2015; Phelps, 2016; Travis, 2014). Arguments for Nebraska’s 
repeal were fueled by fiscal concerns as well as by concerns with a broken 
system (Bearman, 2015b). 
LB268 passed, Governor Ricketts vetoed the bill, and the legislature over-
rode the veto by a one-vote margin. Nebraska thus became the first “red” 
state in the modern era to abolish the death penalty. However, a privately-
funded petition drive, which received money from the governor himself, led 
to a 2016 ballot initiative to reinstate capital punishment (Duggan, 2016; 
Young, 2015). In contrast to abolition movements in other nations, in this 
case political elites favoring reinstatement, including the governor and some 
state senators, successfully tapped into penal populism (Beale, 2014; Suh, 
2015). Nebraskans voted 61% to 39% to keep the death penalty, although 
the urban centers of Omaha and Lincoln were more evenly divided (Ham-
mel, 2016; Nebraska Secretary of State, 2016). In 2018, Nebraska carried out 
its first execution since 1997, which was also its first to use lethal injection 
(Duggan, Hammel, Nitcher, & Stoddard, 2018; The Marshall Project, 2018). 
Nebraska’s experience offers a case study of the nature of public support 
for the death penalty. Further, the timing of two state-wide surveys allowed 
us to capture a specific historical moment, in the wake of the 2015 legisla-
tive repeal, then leading to the 2016 election; to our knowledge, no other 
study on the sources of death penalty support has taken this approach. We 
compared those who preferred the death penalty to those who preferred 
other penalties and those who were unsure, testing factors that may dis-
tinguish among these three groups. We considered TV news consumption, 
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instrumental concerns (i.e., people’s perceptions about the crime rate and 
their worry about crime), expressive concerns (i.e., anger about crime), and 
their attitudes about the government’s role in controlling crime (i.e., fair-
ness, confidence in the justice system, and trust). 
Based on prior work, we posited that death penalty supporters would be 
more likely than supporters of other penalties to: consume TV news, believe 
the crime rate is increasing, worry more about crime, feel angrier about 
crime, think the death penalty is applied fairly, express confidence for the 
justice system, but express less trust in the government on crime. We consid-
ered our comparisons among death penalty supporters, alternative penalty 
supporters, and the unsures to be exploratory, although we anticipated the 
unsures would occupy more ambivalent positions on the independent vari-
ables. Our use of two years of data present an opportunity to discover fac-
tors that consistently (or not) distinguish among these groups, set against 
a unique historical backdrop. 
Methods 
Data 
Data for this study came from two cross-sectional population-based omni-
bus surveys, the Nebraska Annual Social Indicator Survey (NASIS). The sur-
veys were conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research at the University 
of Nebraska – Lincoln. Data were collected each year through mail surveys 
sent to addresses obtained from the US Postal Services Delivery Sequence 
File. This method yields high coverage for household populations (English 
et al., 2012). Data use the “next birthday” method to maintain a probability 
sample (Dillman et al., 2014). 
The 2015 NASIS was collected between 12 August and 20 October, and 
the response rate was 32.7% (AAPOR RR2). Data collection for the 2016 NA-
SIS occurred between 1 September and 10 November, and yielded a response 
rate of 26.9% (AAPOR RR2).4 Listwise deletion was used for both samples, 
and the final analytic samples were 837 for 2015 and 934 for 2016. Analy-
ses employed the population weights provided for each survey.5 
Measures 
Dependent variable. Death penalty support was measured similarly to the 
Gallup item (Jones and Saad, 2014). The question asked “If you could choose 
between the following approaches, which do you think is the best penalty 
for murder?” The options were “death penalty,” “life in prison without the 
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possibility of parole,” “prison with the possibility of parole,” and “unsure/do 
not want to answer.” For analysis, both types of prison sentences, with and 
without the possibility of parole, were combined to form one group, other 
penalty preference. 
Independent variables. The NASIS asked how many days in an average week 
respondents watched “local TV news.” The local news variable was then 
coded so that higher numbers represent more frequent viewing. To mea-
sure national news, the surveys asked two questions about average weekly 
viewing of “national network TV news on ABC, CBS, or NBC” and “national 
cable TV news, like CNN, FOX, or MSNBC.” These two questions were aver-
aged together to create a single indicator of national news viewing, where 
higher numbers represent higher frequency of viewing. 
Perceptions of changes in the crime rate in the United States were mea-
sured by asking respondents to indicate if they thought the rate of crime in 
the United States seemed to be decreasing, staying about the same, or in-
creasing. A dichotomous variable was then created where responses that the 
crime rate seemed to be increasing were coded 1 and decreasing or staying 
about the same were coded 0. 
Worry about crime was measured by asking respondents how often they 
personally worried about walking alone at night, having their residence 
being broken into, getting robbed, getting raped or sexually attacked, get-
ting murdered, and a family member being a victim of a crime. The four re-
sponse options ranged from “not all worried” to “very worried.” Items were 
coded so that higher values indicate more worry, and a mean scale of worry 
was created from the available questions (a=0.87 in 2015; a=0.85 in 2016). 
Anger about crime was measured with two questions about how angry 
people felt when they thought about “crime in this country” and “crime in 
your community.” The four response options ranged from “not at all angry” 
to “very angry.” The items were coded so that higher values indicated more 
anger (Johnson, 2009). The two anger items were highly correlated (r=.75 
in 2015; r=.66 in 2016), so they were averaged to create a single variable 
for anger. The perceived fairness of the death penalty item asked people to 
denote how fair the justice system is in its use of the death penalty (Jones 
and Saad, 2014). The four response options ranged from “not at all fair” to 
“very fair.” The variable was coded so that higher values indicate higher lev-
els of perceived fairness. 
Confidence in the criminal justice system was assessed with four items 
asking how confident respondents were that the criminal justice system 
could reduce crime and reduce drug use, and how confident they were the 
police could protect them from violent crimes like assault and from prop-
erty crimes like theft (Jones and Saad, 2014). The four response categories 
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ranged from “not at all confident” to “very confident.” The items were coded 
so that higher values indicate more confidence, then a mean score was cre-
ated from the available items (α =.82 in 2015; α=.79 in 2016). 
Trust in government information about crime was measured by asking 
people to indicate how reliable they think the government is as a source of 
information about crime (Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011). The four response 
options ranged from “not at all reliable” to “very reliable.” The variables 
were coded so that higher values indicate higher levels of trust in the gov-
ernment as a source of information about crime. 
Control variables. A number of demographic variables were included as con-
trols (Lambert et al., 2011; Oliphant, 2016; Vollum et al., 2004). Urban was 
measured by giving respondents the options “Town/city,” “Farm,” and “Open 
country.” The variable was dichotomized where those that indicated town/
city were coded 1 and others were coded 0. Race was a dichotomous vari-
able: respondents who indicated that they were White were coded 1 and all 
other racial groups were coded 0. Male respondents were coded 1 and female 
respondents were coded 0. Education was a dichotomous variable where a 
bachelor’s degree or higher degree was coded 1, and less than a bachelor’s 
degree was coded 0. Political conservativism was a five-point scale on which 
respondents rated themselves from very liberal (1) to very conservative (5). 
Religious affiliation was a dummy variable where Catholic was coded 1 and 
all other religious affiliations (or lack thereof) were coded 0.6 
Finally, a control was also included for victimization experiences. In the 
2016 NASIS, respondents were asked if they had been a victim of any crime 
in the 12 months. In the 2015 NASIS, however, the question asked “Have 
you, or has any person close to you, been a victim of a crime in the last 12 
months?” On both surveys, the response options were yes (coded 1) or no 
(coded 0). 
Analytic strategy 
To begin our study, we examined how demographic characteristics and the 
substantive variables differed across the three groups of death penalty views. 
Then, we conducted a series of multinomial logistic regression models to 
determine what variables distinguished among the three groups. For each 
year, a model was tested in which death penalty supporters were the refer-
ence group, and the other penalty preference and unsure groups were the 
categories. A model was also tested in which other penalty preference was 
the reference group, and death penalty preference and unsure groups were 
the categories, allowing for a comparison between the other penalty prefer-
ence and the unsures. Additional tests were performed to determine whether 
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there were significant differences in the coefficients across years, the seem-
ingly unrelated estimation (suest) and linear combinations of parameters 
(lincom) commands in STATA. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for each year of data. The percent-
age of respondents who preferred the death penalty decreased five points 
between 2015 (55%) and 2016 (50%). This decline was accompanied by an 
increase in those that indicated that they preferred other penalties for mur-
der, increasing from 35% in 2015 to 43% in 2016. Those who reported that 
they were unsure about the best penalty for murder were at 10% in 2015 
and 7% in 2016. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for each of the three groups; F-sta-
tistics were used to test for differences. There were no significant differ-
ences across groups in either year for worry about crime, confidence in the 
criminal justice system, Catholic, and crime victim. Demographically in both 
years, death penalty supporters were least likely to live in an urban setting, 
more likely to be male, had the lowest prevalence of a bachelor’s degree, and 
had the highest score on conservativism (Anderson et al., 2017). 
Table 1. Weighted descriptive statistics.
 2015 (n=837)   2016 (n=934)
 Mean/   Mean/
Variable name proportion  SE  Range proportion  SE  Range
Death penalty preference  .552   0–1  .497   0–1
Other penalty preference  .347   0–1  .430   0–1
Unsures  .101   0–1  .073   0–1
Local news  4.094  .110  0–7  4.122  .113  0–7
National news  3.947  .089  1–8  4.095  .088  1–8
Increase in US crime rate  .595   0–1  .631   0–1
Worry about crime  2.228  .025  1–4  2.254  .027  1–4
Anger about crime  2.923  .039  1–4  2.993  .035  1–4
Death penalty fair  2.584  .046  1–4  2.468  .043  1–4
Confidence in justice system 1.945  .030  1–4  2.113  .030  1–4
Trust in gov’t info  2.084  .032  1–4  2.111  .034  1–4
Urban  .589   0–1  .791   0–1
White  .892   0–1  .951   0–1
Male  .507   0–1  .499   0–1
Bachelor’s degree  .518   0–1  .536   0–1
Conservatism  3.235  .039  1–5  3.322  .043  1–5
Catholic  .283   0–1  .283   0–1
Crime victim  .010   0–1  .103   0–1
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Examining viewership of local and national news indicates that in 2015 
death penalty supporters had the highest viewership, but in 2016 they had 
the lowest viewership. In both 2015 and 2016, a large proportion of those 
who preferred the death penalty believed that the US crime rate was increas-
ing. They also had the highest means for anger about crime and perceived 
fairness of the death penalty, but the lowest scores for trust in government 
information about crime. 
Table 3 depicts the results from the multinomial regression models in 
which death penalty supporters serve as the reference category. The top 
of the table shows the comparison between death penalty preference and 
other penalty preference. In 2016 compared to death penalty supporters, 
other penalty supporters were less likely to think that the crime rate in the 
United States was increasing. In 2015 and 2016, other penalty supporters 
were less angry about crime and less likely to think that the death penalty 
is applied fairly. Other penalty supporters, compared to death penalty sup-
porters, were also more likely to trust government information. Across both 
years other penalty supporters, compared to death penalty supporters, were 
less likely to be male, more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, and were less 
conservative. Finally, in 2015 other penalty supporters were more likely to 
be Catholic than were death penalty supporters. 
The bottom of Table 3 shows the results of the multinomial regression 
models comparing death penalty preference and those who were unsure 
about the best punishment for murder. In both years, compared to death 
penalty supporters, the unsures felt that the death penalty is applied less 
fairly. In 2016 the unsures were more likely to watch local news (a signif-
icantly stronger relationship that in 2015; t = –2.05, p < .05), but felt less 
angry about crime compared to those who preferred the death penalty. In 
2015 the unsures were less likely to be male and were less conservative 
compared to death penalty supporters, and in 2016, the unsures were less 
likely to be White (a significantly stronger relationship that in 2016; t = 
2.60, p < .01). 
Table 4 shows the results from the multinomial regression models for 
those who preferred other penalties compared to those who were unsure 
about the best penalty for murder. There were two variables that distin-
guished between other penalty preference and the unsures. In 2015 and 
2016, compared to other penalty supporters, the unsures believed that the 
death penalty is applied more fairly (a marginally stronger relationship that 
in 2016; t = –1.92, p < .10), but expressed less trust in the government. Ad-
ditionally, in 2016, the unsures were more likely to watch local news. In 
2015 the unsures were less likely to have a bachelor’s degree or higher ed-
ucation; in 2016, they were less likely to be White, compared to those who 
preferred other penalties. 
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Taken together, the regression analyses revealed that the key variables 
distinguishing among the three groups were trust in government informa-
tion about crime, perceived fairness of the death penalty, and anger about 
crime. Table 2 highlights the significant differences in these three variables 
Table 3. Multinomial regression comparing other penalty preference and the unsure re-
spondents to death penalty preference.
  2015  2016
Variable name  RRR  RRR
Other penalty preference
 Local news  0.97  1.08
 National news  0.93  1.02
 Increase in US crime rate  0.69  0.54*
 Worry about crime  0.97  1.08
 Anger about crime  0.73**  0.69*
 Death penalty fair  0.54***  0.43***
 Confidence in justice system  0.85  0.98
 Trust in gov’t info  2.35***  1.64**
 Urban  1.45  1.55
 White  1.78  0.51
 Male  0.61*  0.58*
 Bachelor’s degree  2.50***  1.49*
 Conservatism  0.78*  0.75**
 Catholic  2.31***  1.50
 Crime victim  0.83  1.22
Unsure respondents
 Local news  1.03  1.29**
 National news  0.86  0.95
 Increase in US crime rate  0.76  0.70
 Worry about crime  0.88  0.80
 Anger about crime  0.77  0.59*
 Death penalty fair  0.69**  0.76*
 Confidence in justice system  1.10  0.95
 Trust in gov’t info  0.97  1.06
 Urban  1.36  1.48
 White  1.12  0.14**
 Male  0.37**  0.57
 Bachelor’s degree  1.02  0.96
 Conservatism  0.67*  0.88
 Catholic  1.47  1.55
 Crime victim  0.92  0.69
 F  5.84***  5.53***
Death penalty preference is the reference group. Relative risk ratio reported. 
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; *** p  ≤ .001
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across the groups. In both years, death penalty supporters were angriest 
about crime, thought the death penalty was fairly applied, and had the least 
trust in the government regarding crime; other penalty supporters were on 
the other end of the spectrum. 
Those who were unsure about the best penalty for murder generally fell 
somewhere between the other two groups, but there was some variability 
by year. In both years, death penalty supporters reported the greatest level 
of perceived fairness, other penalty supporters the lowest level, with the un-
sures falling squarely in the middle. Although the unsures had low levels of 
trust similar to death penalty supporters in 2015, in 2016 the unsures were 
situated between the other two groups. In contrast, in 2015, the unsures 
mean levels for anger were centered between the other groups, but in 2016 
the unsures had levels of anger similar to other penalty supporters. Also 
of note, given the regression results, is that the unsures reported watching 
more local (and national) news in 2016 compared to the other two groups. 
Few demographic characteristics robustly distinguished the unsures from 
the other groups in the regressions, suggesting that attitudinal factors play 
an important role. 
Table 4. Multinomial regression comparing the unsure respondents to other penalty preference.
 2015  2016
Variable name  RRR  RRR
Unsure respondents
Local news  1.06  1.20*
National news  0.92  0.93
Increase in US crime rate  1.07  1.30
Worry about crime  0.90  0.74
Anger about crime  1.11  0.86
Death penalty fair  1.28*  1.75***
Confidence in justice system  1.30  0.97
Trust in gov’t info  0.41***  0.65*
Urban  0.95  0.96
White  0.63  0.27*
Male  0.60  0.99
Bachelor’s degree  0.41**  0.64
Conservatism  0.86  1.18
Catholic  0.63  1.03
Crime victim  1.13  0.56
F  5.84***  5.53***
Other penalty preference is the reference group. Relative risk ratios reported.
Contrast with death penalty preference not shown.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
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Discussion 
Our analysis indicated that trust in the government’s information about 
crime, perceptions of death penalty fairness, and anger about crime distin-
guished among death penalty support groups. The only instrumental con-
cern that distinguished between death penalty preference and other penalty 
preference appeared in 2016: leading into the election, death penalty sup-
porters were more likely to believe the crime rate was increasing. Instead, 
death penalty attitudes were rooted in people’s sentiments about the gov-
ernment and their feelings about crime. 
The unsures, perhaps not surprisingly, tended to fall somewhere between 
the other groups. Compared to death penalty supporters, the unsures were 
less likely to believe the death penalty is fairly applied and were less angry 
about crime. However, when compared to supporters of other penalties, the 
unsures were more likely to view the death penalty as fairly applied yet ex-
press less trust in the government regarding crime information. Among the 
unsures, ambivalence about capital punishment may be rooted in uncertainty 
about both the fair application of the death penalty and the reliability of in-
formation the government provides about crime. 
Presuming that the unsures have the most malleable position, we can only 
speculate how this positioning ultimately influenced the 2016 vote.7 For ex-
ample, it is perhaps telling that the unsures, compared to the other groups, 
were more engaged in local news in 2016, when the death penalty received 
a good deal of media coverage because of the impending vote. Nebraska’s 
correctional system also experienced a string of high-profile problems lead-
ing into the 2016 election, including a riot that left two inmates dead, an es-
cape of two inmates who had been convicted of violent crimes, assaults on 
staff, and the start of trials associated with the riot. Drawing on Dardis et al. 
(2008) and Wozniak (2017), we suggest that the unsures who are swayed to 
death penalty support may feel the government cannot be trusted on crime, 
prisons do not appear harsh enough, and the death penalty is “fair enough” 
to err on the side of the status quo. 
The results also lend support to Zimring’s (2003) theorizing about the 
role of distrust in holding punitive sentiments. Unnever and Cullen (2010) 
implied that instrumental concerns about crime function alongside distrust 
to drive punitiveness; our instrumental measures generally had little im-
pact in the models (Tyler and Weber, 1982). Instead, we found anger about 
crime to be key (Hartnagel and Templeton, 2012). To the extent that anger 
about crime is rooted in insecurities about the state of society or the moral 
order, support for the death penalty is both value expressive and a matter of 
principle (Vollum et al., 2004: 528). In this way, anger mirrors the emotive 
nature of vigilantism described by Zimring. Indeed, Nebraska’s history in-
cludes strains of vigilantism (Kammer, 2011) and lynching (Menard, 2010). 
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At the same time, trends toward abolition exist within contemporary po-
litical context (Garland, 2005). The 2015–2016 election cycle exposed anxi-
eties that may have fermented a desire for hostile solidarity (Carvalho and 
Chamberlen, 2018). Although the theoretical questions cannot be fully an-
swered by this study, the tenacity of the death penalty in some American 
states—even when their legislators move toward abolition—may best be un-
derstood for its symbolic and expressive qualities among the public (Beck-
ett et al., 2016; Garland, 2010). 
Limitations 
A major limitation of this study was our inability to capture racial animus, 
which prior research has demonstrated to be a central predictor of punitive 
sentiments and death penalty support (Barkan and Cohn, 2005; Brown and 
Socia, 2017; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Likewise, we did not capture feel-
ings of economic uncertainty (Lehmann and Pickett, 2016). Both factors may 
be channeled through our broad measure of anger about crime (Elchardus 
et al., 2008; Wozniak, 2016a), or they may exert independent effects that 
would allow for a more well-rounded understanding of death penalty atti-
tudes. Future analyses of within-state attitudes would benefit from includ-
ing these measures. 
Another limitation of this study was the slight inconsistencies in survey 
structure between the years. As these were omnibus surveys, question order, 
placement, and other formatting variations may also slightly influence re-
sponses. This may have contributed to some differences in the effects of vari-
ables within models across the years; however, the ability of the variables for 
fairness, trust, and anger to consistently distinguish among the groups sug-
gests the relevance of these forces for understanding death penalty attitudes. 
Among the particular measures, there is room for improvement. First, 
our measure of death penalty support echoes national polls, but it does limit 
respondents to a small range of options. Attitudinal or Likert scales some-
times embed “neutral” or “uncertain” within the scales themselves, so that 
unsure respondents are essentially captured between those who have clearer 
opinions (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Vollum et al., 2004). Other scales 
designed to measure how important the topic is to the respondents, then as-
sess “strength” of attitudes or the conditions under which respondents sup-
port the death penalty may allow for greater insight into factors associated 
with uncertainty (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Worthen et al., 2014). Sec-
ond, whether the death penalty is “unfair” is left to respondents’ interpreta-
tion, which could reflect concerns about racial biases and/ or executing the 
innocent (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007). A more specific measure would bet-
ter account for these explanations. 
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Third, trust as measured here does not allow us to distinguish between 
Unnever and Cullen’s (2010) and Zimring’s (2003) conceptualization of gov-
ernment distrust. Confidence in the system itself, which is generally how 
distrust has been interpreted, had little impact in our models, but people 
feeling the government was a reliable source of crime information did. The 
language in the latter item may confound “information” with the narrower 
concept of “official data,” as well as confound government with the media 
who filter its information (Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011). Future research is 
necessary to explore how confidence, reliability, and trustworthiness are in-
tertwined. Finally, our measure of value expressiveness—anger about crime—
is relatively narrow. Future research is needed in order to develop a fuller 
range of expressive measures, particularly research that explores the inter-
sections of moral outrage, hostility, insecurity, distrust, and punitiveness. 
Nebraska’s experience may not be generalizable to other states, which 
have unique histories and relationships with capital punishment. Additional 
research within other states may yield commonalities as well as distinguish-
ing characteristics (Doob and Webster, 2014). To reiterate, these were pop-
ulation samples, not samples of registered or likely voters. Trying to project 
how or why people voted (or otherwise engaged politically) a certain way 
would be imprudent. Rather than predicting outcomes, our study offers a 
more nuanced picture of public opinion about the death penalty, set against 
a particular historical backdrop. 
Conclusions 
Answering the call for paying more attention to respondents typically ex-
cluded from analyses, our study suggests that the “unsure” and “don’t know” 
respondents are not empirical nuisances. The unsures may have theoretical 
importance, both in criminal justice research and public opinion research 
more broadly (Laurison, 2015; Oravecz et al., 2014; Unnever et al., 2005). 
Rather than relegating them to missing data, future research should con-
sider the roles they may play in public opinion about criminal justice and 
other issues. The unsures may not be simply disengaged but instead strug-
gling to form a firm opinion in an information-laden and seemingly unset-
tled socio-political landscape. 
Some have been optimistic about penal reform (Green, 2013; National Re-
search Council, 2014), even in red states (Thielo et al., 2015); others see a 
longer road ahead (Woznick 2016b). Gottschalk (2014) cautioned that eco-
nomic insecurity of the kind exaggerated by the 2007 recession could re-
ignite punitiveness, portending a renewed penal populism (Lehmann and 
Pickett, 2016). America’s retributive strain seems to endure. In 2016, Califor-
nia and Nebraska retained their death penalties, while Oklahoma enshrined 
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theirs in the state’s constitution despite a moratorium on its use (Cohen, 
2016). Indeed, the rise of populism that marked the 2016 election cycle may 
be seen in the threads of government distrust among Nebraska’s unsures, 
and in the anger and distrust that distinguished Nebraskans who preferred 
the death penalty for murder from those who preferred alternatives. For-
ward momentum on abolishing capital punishment in US states may be (tem-
porarily) halted by a political context that embraces hostile solidarity (Car-
valho and Chamberlen, 2018). While the death penalty in the United States 
may eventually fall into disuse (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Garland, 2005), 
capital punishment still symbolically embodies the expressive desire and 
moral imperative to take action against crime and perceived disorder. 
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Notes 
1. This may account for the discrepancy between Gallup and Pew trends. Gallup’s 
survey item is: “Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of 
murder?” The response categories are yes/no. Pew’s survey item is: “Do you 
strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose the death penalty for persons 
convicted of murder?” The response categories reflect the question. Both sur-
veys have options for “don’t know/refused.” 
2. While it is possible this group may be excluded because of small analytic num-
bers, such a justification is typically not forwarded by authors. Rather, “coded 
into missing” happens as a matter of routine (e.g., Unnever et al., 2005: 193) or 
as a matter of analytic framing (e.g., Messner et al., 2006). 
3. Kelley (2015) provided a history of the death penalty in Nebraska in the run up 
to the 2015 effort to repeal. 
4. The sampling error for both surveys was about 2% to 3%. 
5. The samples were older (39% over 65 versus 18.4%) and comprised of more fe-
males (59.7% female versus 50.9%) than reflected in the Nebraska 2010 cen-
sus estimates. Nebraska was approximately 89% White, similar to the samples. 
The three state regions (Omaha/Midland, Lincoln/Southeast, Central/West) were 
equally represented. 
6. In 2016 the Nebraska Catholic Conference advocated against reinstating the death 
penalty (Nohr, 2016). 
7. Data were from population-based surveys, not registered or likely voters. Lau-
rison (2015) reported that respondents who indicate “don’t know” are also un-
likely to vote. 
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